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The World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) recently released a joint report (2017) warning against the turn of the global trade policy agenda. Indeed, in a context of erratic global trade developments, policy issues returned in the spotlight both in politics and academia (Feng et al., 2017; Nicita and Murina, 2017; Baccini et al., forthcoming; Blanchard et al., 2016; Conconi et al., 2016; Haaland and Venables, 2016; Baldwin, 2011; Antras and Yeaple, 2013; Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010) . Even if tariffs are at historically low levels, non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an important -and growing -role in global trade policy, as certified by the burgeoning interest of international governmental and non-governmental bodies (i.a. Cadot and Malouche, 2012; UN, 2013; WTO, 2012; GTA, 2018) , and their impacts on trade are potentially more complex than those of tariffs.
Figure 1: NTMs, 1996-2016
Source: Authors' elaboration on i-tip.wto.org. Note: "NTMs" represents the sum of all different NTMs initiated and in force in a specific year, using a flow approach.
Theoretical and empirical work on NTMs provides mixed results. As brilliantly summarised by Fugazza (2013) , from a theoretical perspective it is ambiguous how certain type of NTMs (e.g. technical regulations) may affect exporters' and importers' behaviour, and therefore trade (see also Bertola and Faini, 1990 , with special emphasis on quotas). On the empirical side, the recent literature has largely concentrated on the effect of sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS, a subset of technical measures) on trade, with overwhelming attention to agricultural products (e.g. Nicita and Murina, 2017; Ferro et al., 2015; Melo et al., 2015; whereas Fontagné et al, 2015 , cover the entire spectrum of HS-4 sectors; Gibson and Wang, 2018) .
There are no clear-cut results: at the aggregated level (using panel data including different exporting countries), the effect of NTMs on trade is mixed at best (Ghodsi et al., 2017; Hayakawa et al., 2016) . We therefore decided to focus on China, the world biggest exporter.
Increasing competition from China has been pointed as one of the causes that reinvigorated the recent revival of trade policy measures, with accuses of being the driver of increases in unemployment (Autor et al., 2013) , lower wages (Ashournia et al., 2014) , or affecting political and electoral patterns (see Colantone and Stanig, forthcoming (a); Colantone and Stanig, forthcoming (b); Che et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016). 1 In this paper, using a new measure of NTMs (Nicita and Murina, 2017) , a recently released database (UNCTAD, 2017) , and relying on gravity models (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Head and Mayer, 2014; Glick and Rose, 2016; UNCTAD-WTO; , we focus on Chinese exports with two aims in mind: the first is to disentangle the effects of destination country's NTMs on Chinese exports. Due to possible heterogeneous effects of different NTMs on trade flows, we separate NTMs measures by groups, i.e. technical (mainly product regulations to promote certain standards) and non-technical (i.e. anti-dumping and other measures inclined to shelter domestic producers from import competition) measures (UNCTAD, 2015) . In addition, we also aim to measure empirically whether NTMs have heterogeneous effects for specific sets of goods. Indeed, focusing trade policy on intermediate goods would rise input costs and possibly disrupt global value chains. Oppositely, following political economy arguments (Baccini et al., forthcoming), we would expect final goods to be the focus of more restrictive NTMs, as they induce tougher import competition (Amiti and Konings, 2007) . Final goods may report larger NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of substitutability (Jones, 2011) .
We find that -at least in the case of measures related with Chinese exportsmeasuring NTMs as a uniform aggregate may be misleading. NTMs have heterogeneous effects on trade. A first type of heterogeneity is at NTMs level: whereas technical NTMs tend to have positive effects on trade flows (likely to be demand-driven), non-technical NTMs do not have clear effects (having a negative but not significant coefficient). In addition, NTMs have heterogeneous effects also at the product level: in particular, non-technical NTMs have negative effects for final goods. As outlined above, this may be due to political economy reasons or heterogeneous substitution effects.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II revises the relevant literature on gravity models, NTMs and the political economy of trade policy. Section III explains our methodological choice and provide the relevant details. Section IV briefly describes data used. Section V analyses the main results and their robustness. Section VI concludes.
1 A parallel strand of literature estimate welfare effects related to "China's trade shock", finding aggregate welfare gains (Feenstra and Weinstein, 2017) , however with considerable within-state variance (Caliendo et al., 2015) .
Literature Review
The prominence of trade costs within international trade theory served as a natural magnet for many applied economists investigating its influences on trade flows (and economic growth).
With the changing trend in relative importance between tariffs and NTMs during the last decades, the need of explicitly account for the latter in models and estimations became French firm level data to detect a negative impact of trade barriers (sample restricted to SPS) on both margins of exports. Kirpichev and Moral-Benito (2018) , using a panel of Spanish firms, found that newly introduced NTMs do not only have negative effects on export growth, but also on other firm dimensions (e.g. productivity). In parallel, another strand of literature points toward a positive effect of specific certification measures and other standards, mainly on imports from 2 In parallel, in a quest for coherent variables available for properly identifying a reduction in trade costs, a part of the literature focused on free trade agreements (FTAs) and currency unions (CUs), as they are expected to reduce trade costs. Concretely, FTAs are supposed to influence tariffs and NTMs. Most of the studies find a clear positive relation with FTAs and bilateral trade flows, but do not differentiate its drivers, including a dummy variable that identifies dichotomously the existence of an agreement and the eventual membership of the two countries involved in bilateral trade (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Philippidis and Sanjuán, 2007; Hayakawa and Kimura, 2015; Caporale et al., 2009; Kawasaki, 2015; Thorbecke, 2015a; Freeman and Pienknagura, 2016) . CUs instead, are expected to reduce transaction costs, favouring trade. Rose's seminal contribution (2000) -together with Glick and Rose (2002) calculating the effects of the use of a common currency on bilateral trade flows started a buoyant discussion on methods and techniques for minimising the potential estimation errors. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) provide a detailed survey, highlighting the famous "gold, silver and bronze" errors and how to avoid them, while still applying gravity models. Rose (2017) and Glick and Rose (2016) recently summarised the results and provides new estimates for the entry and exit effects. For historical evidence on currency unions and trade see, i.a., Flandreau (2000), López-Córdova and Meissner (2003) and Timini (2018) . 3 A precursor of this index was the TRI elaborated by the IMF in its review for the "Trade Liberalization in IMF-Supported Programs (EBS/97/163). Used mainly for managerial purposes, it has not been exempted by critics as some biases arose in the way tariffs and NTMs were rated. 4 See data section for more details developing countries (e.g. Henson and Humprey, 2009; Henson et al., 2011; Murina and Nicita, 2017) . Trimarchi (2018), focusing on anti-dumping measures, and Leonardi and Meschi (2016) extend these positive effects to the labour market. Among these, Murina and Nicita (2017) exploits the rich UNCTAD-TRAINS database in a disaggregated fashion, using a cross-section perspective, focussing on the effect of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on agricultural imports in the EU market, and how the level of development in the country of origin may affect the capacities for compliance (the higher the income, the lower the difficulty of meeting the required standards).
Nevertheless, despite its role in the world economy, there is no work focusing on the whole set of NTMs for the specific case of Chinese exports. Imbruno (2016) examines its imports and assesses the effectiveness of a group of trade policy instruments since the Chinese accession to the WTO. Caporale et al. (2016) instead, analyses exports to the main destinations, and its relationship with the Chinese industrial structure, using aggregate data, and not including in the gravity model any proxies for NTMs. Chandra (2016) In other words, we aim to estimate the effects of NTMs on Chinese exports, at product-country level, differentiating by NTMs (i.e. between technical and non-technical measures) and by product classification (i.e. final and non-final good). The reasons for doing so are threefold: first, we aim to estimate the effects of the NTMs imposed by destination countries on Chinese exports. Second, we aim to take into account and disentangle possible heterogeneous effects of different NTMs. Indeed, in some cases, demand side effects may be positive: for example consumers may buy more products with higher regulatory requirements as they will reflect more sophisticated health, safety, and possibly also environmental protection standards (e.g. Nicita and Murina, 2017) . Supply side effects may not be necessarily negative, if regulation does not directly aim to shield producers from import competition (as in case, for example of SPS measures, and other "technical" measures, as defined by UNCTAD, 2015). Nevertheless, if the final aim of NTMs is to shelter domestic producers, it is highly likely to have negative effects on the supply side (e.g. those
NTMs classified by UNCTAD, 2015, as non-technical, i.e. anti-dumping and other measures inclined to shelter domestic producers from import competition, which translates in measures ranges from "contingent trade-protective" to "non-automatic licensing, quotas, prohibitions and quantity control", and from "trade-related investment" to "government procurement restrictions"). Moreover, we want to test for the possible existence of "political economy" arguments or heterogeneous substitution effects: NTMs may be more restrictive in some cases (i.e. have larger negative/positive effects for a specific set of goods "official" strictu sensu. More importantly (at least from the perspective of our analysis), it does not provide information on the NTMs "stock" (i.e. how many NTMs for each product were there at the beginning of the period). Finally, the third database, is the UNCTAD TRAINS, the "global database on NTMs", 14 which provides information at the highest internationally comparable level of disaggregation (HS 6 digit) for a large number of countries. Therefore, for NTMs, we decided to capitalise on the latter, as it includes information on the NTMs "stock" (the number of NTMs imposed by each country at the product level) at the finest internationally comparable level of disaggregation (HS 6 digit). In addition, we classified each product by the basic classes of goods identified in the System of National Accounts (SNA). Each one of these is related to 11 https://wits.worldbank.org/ 12 More information at: http://pronto.wti.org. 13 More information at: http://www.globaltradealert.org. 14 http://trains.unctad.org/.
15 The member states of the European Union are included in the database as a single country, as the EU trade policy is defined at the Union level. See Appendix I for the complete list of countries included in the database.
Results
The results from the gravity model, with pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood estimates, are presented in Table 1 . Column 1 represents a standard specification for panel gravity models focussed on understanding the effects of trade policy tools. Beyond the time, sector and (pseudo) country-pair fixed effects, it includes the effectively applied tariff variable, which reports a negative and significant coefficient. This means, as expected, that a tariff increase in country j reduces Chinese exports to country j. Moreover, it also includes the logarithm of the destination country GDP and the MRI. Column 2 contains -in addition to the previous regression -the regulatory index (RI, we test the robustness of a logarithmic specification in the robustness section), including all type of NTMs. The coefficient is positive and significant, meaning that, there is an association between higher NTMs and higher trade flows. The average result may be driven by positive demand side effects. It can be the case that consumers are more willing to buy products with higher regulatory requirements (increasing the trade value), in terms of technical standards. However, it is difficult to imagine that nontechnical barriers may have any positive effects. Therefore, in column 3, we allow for heterogeneous effects of technical and non-technical NTMs, via two different variables. Indeed, we confirm our suspects that the NTMs positive and significant coefficient in column 2 was driven by technical NTMs, such as SPS measures. Non-technical NTMs have a negative coefficient, although is not significant. Finally, in column 4 we additionally introduce a dummy ("final") and its interaction with both subsets of NTMs (RI-tech and RI-nontech). In this way we test for the possible existence of heterogeneous effects for different product subsets: NTMs may be more restrictive in some cases (i.e. have larger negative effects for a specific set of goods). Indeed, trade policies focusing on intermediate goods would rise input costs and possibly disrupt global value chains. Oppositely, following political economy arguments (Baccini et al., forthcoming), we would expect final goods to be the focus of non-technical NTMs as they induce tougher import competition (Amiti and Konings, 2007) . However, final goods may report larger NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of substitutability (Jones, 2011) . 
Robustness analysis
To ensure the robustness of the results, we considered a set of alternative specifications.
Results are included in Table 2 .
In the first set of robustness tests, we focus on the NTMs functional form. In the main regression we included NTMs in logarithm, however there is no agreement yet in the literature.
Therefore, we test -in column 1 -the incorporation of NTMs as a dummy (=1 if RI-tech and RI-nontech are ≥1, respectively), and in levels (column 2). Changing the NTMs functional form does not produce any relevant change to our main results.
In the second set of robustness test, we consider possible geographical and institutional peculiarities that may in turn introduce biases in the results. In column 3, we address the legitimate concern that "Honk Kong traders distribute a large fraction of China's exports" (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004) , therefore counting Chinese exports only may be a source of bias. Consequently, we combined Chinese with Honk Kong exports for a product k to a country j. In column 4, we take into account the prominence and peculiarities of the China-US trade relationship (Thorbecke, 2015b), running a regression without China-US bilateral data to check whether overall results are driven by this subset. In both cases results hold, with coefficient equal in sign and significance, and very similar in "size". In column 5, in line with column 4, we exclude trade with the European Union, to check that results are not driven by the specificities of this important trade relationship.
In column 6 we exclude agricultural products from the regression. Even if agricultural products constitute a minority of Chinese exports (Zhang, 2006) , we aim to prove that the NTMs-related effects in this analysis go beyond those typically related to SPS in agricultural products (e.g. Gibson and Wang, 2018; Nicita and Murina, 2017; Ferro et al., 2015; Melo et al., 2015) .
In the last set of robustness test, we address some general issues related to the equation specification choice. Therefore, in column 7 we run a regression at 4-digit HS level, instead of our preferred choice of 6-digit HS level. In other words, we use trade flows at a more aggregated level. This imply some assumptions on tariffs (to have the applied tariff at the 4-digit level, we calculate the average effects among 6-digit products) and NTMs (we simply sum the number of NTMs across products, assuming there is no equal regulation across product). Finally, in column 8, we relax the sector fixed effects, with the introduction of 1-digit sector fixed effects.
It is worth noting that across all specifications, there are no changes in the sign or significance of our main variables of interests. NTMs effects also because of a higher degree of substitutability (Jones, 2011) .
These conclusions have a twofold relevance for increasing our understanding of trade policy effects in general, and NTMs in particular. In the first case, we argue that it is necessary to disentangle NTMs by group (at least allowing the technical -non-technical dichotomy to emerge) in order to fully grasp the diversity of demand and supply-side effects. In addition, we claim that to understand non-technical NTMs effects is necessary to go beyond aggregate flows, as these seem to concentrate (i.e. to have stronger effects) on a particular set of products, namely final goods.
Our results call for further research to understand whether NTMs have been used in substitution of traditional trade policy tools (e.g. tariffs, quotas, see i.a. Blonigen and Prusa, 2003; Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005; Ketterer, 2016) , particularly focusing on final goods to shelter domestic firms from the surge in international competition deriving from the "secular decline" of tariff rates. 
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